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I. INTRODUCTION
A potentially revolutionary shift is taking place in the wholesale
electricity markets that provide power for roughly half the nation's
customers. At present, these markets handle power generated and sold
through a bidding process, which retail distribution utilities and other
"load-serving entities" (LSEs) then sell to retail customers. The wholesale
markets receive bids from generators who offer energy for sale for
particular time periods. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) and
Independent System Operators (ISO), the familiar stewards of transmission
systems in roughly half the nation,' administer these markets. They
dispatch generators from lowest to highest bids until all power demand
is met, following the limits of safe and reliable dispatch.
A relatively new set of players has recently begun to participate in
wholesale energy markets,^ offering a different commodity: "demand
response" (DR). Demand response is, "a reduction in the consumption
of electric energy by customers from their expected consumption in
response to an increase in the price of electric energy or to incentive
payments designed to induce lower consumption of electric energy."'
1. An RTO is an independent organization that sets tariffs for transmission,
manages congestion, and monitors the markets. ISOs are comparable independent regulated
entities that coordinate regional transmission to ensure grid safety and reliability. The current
RTOs and ISOs in the U.S. are ISO-New England, PJM Interconnection, Midwest ISO,
New York ISO, Southwest Power Pool, Califomia ISO, and Electric Reliability Council
of Texas. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) / Independent System Operators
(ISO), FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.
asp (last updated Feb. 19, 2013). For the purposes of this Article, ISOs and RTOs are treated
identically because they both operate wholesale energy markets, and the differences between
them are not critical to the discussion.
2. PowerPoint: Role of Retail Regulation in Demand Response 7 (Robert L. Borlick
2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Borlick, MADRI Presentation], available at
http://sites.energetics.com/madri/pdfs/MADRI_Presentation_Borlick_02-02-l2.pdf (noting
that, "[t]he introduction of third-party aggregators of retail customers (ARCs) that sell
the demand response of another market participant's retail customers is a new market
paradigm that has only recently come into existence.").
3. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(4) (2012); see also U.S. Dep't of Energy, Demand
Response—Policy, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/oe/electricity-policy-coordination-
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These new firms will aggregate consumer agreements to refrain from
using electricity, and offer the block of resulting reductions in demand
for sale in the wholesale energy markets. By deftnition, this is a completely
different product than wholesale markets trade at present. Demand response
is not "energy," but a reduction in consumption.
That reduction can have numerous benefits. It can directly reduce
overall demand for electricity. Like other demand-side strategies (including
conservation and efficiency),'' it can have the added benefit of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and the need for constmcting new power
plants.^ It can also contribute to increased reliability of the electric grid.^
Noting these benefits, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 declared a national
policy to encourage DR.^
Increased DR is also an essential building block of the Smart Grid,
which anticipates a revolutionary transformation of consumers' relationship
with the electric grid.^ It is an interactive and dynamic application that
can spur the growth of other two-way uses of a Smart Grid, such as
greater incorporation of distributed energy resources. For this reason,
DR is the Smart Grid's "killer app."'
and-implementation/state-and-regional-policy-assistance/technic-l (last visited Feb. 18,
2013).
4. See, e.g., MAGGIE ELDRIDGE ET AL., ENERGY EFFICIENCY: THE FIRST FUEL FOR
A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE 34 (2008), available at http://www.aceee.org/research-report/
eO82.
5. See, e.g., Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the
Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968,
(2004) (including demand-side strategies).
6. PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND
THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 46 (2011) (describing carbon-saving impacts of
"aggressive DR"); FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, DOCKET NO. AD-06-2-000 ,
ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & ADVANCED METERING 12 (2006) [hereinafter
FERC 2006 DR-AMI REPORT] (noting that, "Demand response may provide environmental
benefits by reducing generation plants' emissions during peak periods.").
7. 16 U.S.C. §2642(d) (2006).
8. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism For the Smart
Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing the Smart Grid and DR's
potential in it).
9. Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and the Clean Energy
Floor, 92 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (citing to statements of FERC Chairman Jon
Wellinghoff); U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, 2010 SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT 3 (2012),
available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/20IO%20Smart%20Grid%20System%20
Report.pdf (terming "the integration of distributed generation (DG), storage, and
demand-side resources for participation in electricity system operation" the "largest 'new
frontier'" for the Smart Grid).
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The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has issued a
controversial "Order 745" that requires DR to be compensated in wholesale
energy markets at the same price as electricity bid into the markets.'"
This requires FERC to view the markets differently than it has until now.
For years, FERC has largely defined its regulatory role as fostering
competition in electricity generation and promoting the sale of electricify
at its lowest cost." By promoting DR, it is shifting to using the wholesale
power system to achieve environmental objectives and other social
goals. This would transform the wholesale market as ftindamentally as
FERC's initial restmcturing orders that fostered the markets' creation.
This Article argues that Order 745 is both justified under the Federal
Power Act (FPA) and important to ensure the transition to a clean energy
future. A challenge to Order 745, Electric Power Supply Association v.
FERC, is currently pending in the D.C. Circuit.'^ This Article contends
that Order 745 should be upheld against this challenge because it fits
within FERC's broad authorify to regulate the wholesale power markets.'''
Under the Federal Power Act, FERC may regulate practices that are
"affecting or pertaining to" wholesale market prices for electricity.'''
The D.C. Circuit should interpret this language to give FERC broad
authorify to regulate DR. Order 745 requires DR to be compensated
because it has system-wide impacts on prices and reliability, in addition
to its environmental benefits.'^ D.C. Circuit precedent supports FERC's
role, as the designer and overseer of the wholesale markets, to redesign
those markets broadly to achieve these goals. Order 745 is therefore
10. Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76
Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,659 (Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter
FERC Order 745].
11. See, e.g.. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 810 (Jan. 6,
2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35.24 (2012)) [hereinafter FERC Order 2000] (advancing
the formation of RTOs, noting that, "[t]he Commission's goal is to promote efficiency in
wholesale electricity markets and to ensure that electricity consumers pay the lowest
price possible for reliable service").
12. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 23,2011).
13. FERC's "just and reasonable" authority has been interpreted for decades to
give it broad latitude "to consider some matters going beyond the direct financial interests of
buyers and sellers in wholesale transactions [such as] 'conservation, environmental, and
antitrust questions.'" Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring
Consideration of the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional
Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 545 (2007) (quoting Nat'l Ass'n for
the Advancement of Colored People v. Fed. Power Comm'n., 425 U.S. 662 (1976)).
14. 16U.S.C. §824d(a)(2006).
15. Rossi & Hutton, supra note 9 (noting that, "for FERC's new demand response
approach to survive legal challenges, the agency will likely need to depend on an expansive
interpretation of the goals of the FPA, as including not only consumer protection but also
reliability goals related to the system as a whole, and conservation and environmental
goals").
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supportable over its opponents''^ claim that it is an impermissible
expansion of federal authority because DR does not involve sales of
energy.'^
FERC should promote a wholesale market design that encourages DR.
In a perfect electricity market, consumers with smart meters would
respond directly to wholesale market prices and vary their consumption
accordingly. However, this seamless connection between the wholesale
and retail levels may take many years to develop. In the meantime,
FERC has decided that states' DR programs alone will be insufficient to
encourage more demand reductions. Order 745 is not an exclusive
policy path. It neither eliminates nor preempts state DR programs, and
the Supreme Court has empowered FERC to regulate in similar situations of
mixed federal-state jurisdiction, even if it might have some adverse
impacts on state programs.
Opponents also argue that even if FERC justifies Order 745 as
"leaming by doing," in the words of one critic, the price tag is too high.
They claim that FERC has overcompensated DR by valuing it at the
market price, asserting that those who reduce demand get a double
reward by also receiving the savings fi^ om electricify purchases foregone.'^
However, providing electricity generation supply at the lowest possible
cost is neither the only goal that FERC may pursue under the FPA, nor,
in this Article's view, is it essential here. Moreover, FERC has created a
net benefits test to promote DR's substantial environmental, reliability,
consumer interactivity and other benefits without incurring excessive
costs. FERC's judgment that the net benefits test will keep near-term
costs of experimentation down is entitled to deference.
16. Order 745's challengers include the Electric Power Supply Association, the
Edison Electric Institute, the American Public Power Association, Dominion Electric
Cooperative, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, the Califomia
Independent System Operator, and the California Public Utilities Commission.
17. Their views are outlined in an amicus brief opposing Order 745. Brief for
Robert L. Borlick, etal. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Elec. Power Supply
Ass'n V. FERC, No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. flied Dec. 23, 2011) (noting that, "[a]mici curiae
(listed in Addendum A) are leading economists and educators who have designed,
studied, taught, and written about the electricity markets affected by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission Final Rule under review here").
18. The central substantive issue in Electric Power Supply Association is whether
the market price, the so-called "locational marginal price" (LMP), or LMP minus the
applicable retail rate (LMP-G) is the appropriate level of compensation for DR.
Opponents argue that DR priced at full LMP provides a windfall to retail customers. See
irifra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing this argument).
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On the whole. Order 745 is valuable policy experimentation. FERC
believes that DR bid by intermediaries into wholesale markets will yield
important experience and hard evidence about how to reap much greater
benefits in the friture." Given that demand-side strategies have been
underemphasized on the electric grid for decades, it is reasonable for
FERC to promote experimentation with a new business model. This
overcomes opponents' arguments that DR unnecessarily interposes
intermediaries in the market, instead of letting the market perform its
low-cost clearing function. Aggregators may tum out to be a dismptive
force in the industry, acting more nimbly, and therefore more capably
than utilities in promoting DR. Therefore, this Article contends that
FERC's authorify to promulgate Order 745 is and should be deemed frilly
supportable under a Chevron analysis and the case law interpreting FPA
section 205.
II. DEMAND RESPONSE, THE POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC DR, AND
THE BARRIERS TO MORE WIDESPREAD DEPLOYMENT
Order 745 applies only to demand response bid into wholesale energy
markets. Demand response includes numerous techniques by which
end-use customers directly reduce consumption of electricity.^" It is
fundamentally different from energy that generators produce and bid
into energy markets. Demand response is not energy, but a mechanism
designed to save it. A customer that reduces consumption using a DR
technique has used less energy, not purchased more of it. DR is also
different from energy efficiency improvements that make consumers more
efficient per unit of electricity consumed.^' Typically, consumers reduce
their use of electricity in response to emergency needs on the electric
grid or price signals. An example would be a system using sensors on
devices that consume large amounts of electricify, such as air conditioning
19. A good example of this is the provision of Order 745 stating that dynamic
integration of the net benefits test into RTOs' dispatch algorithms may produce more
precise wholesale market prices over time. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,672
(calling for a study of this issue).
20. FERC 2006 DR-AMI REPORT, supra note 6, at x; FERC's most recent annual
report on DR activities in the United States is FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N,
ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & ADVANCED METERING (2011) [hereinafter FERC
2011 DR-AMI REPORT].
21. MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 147 (2011).
"Demand-side management (DSM)" includes both DR and energy efficiency programs
and incentives. For a discussion of state efficiency programs, see COLUMBIA CTR. FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, COLUMBIA LAW SCH., PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS AND ENERGY
EFFICIENCY: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL & REGULATORY TOOLS FOR COMMISSIONERS &
ADVOCATES (2012), available at http://www.law.Columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_
events/2201 /august2012/Climate-Law-PUC-Report.
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units, that link the devices to a utility or third party that can cut back the
device's use automatically if the price of electricity increases.
Order 745 governs DR bid in quantities of megawatt-hours (MWh) by
intermediaries into day-ahead or real-time wholesale energy markets.
These firms are known as "aggregators," "curtailment service providers,"
or, in Order 745's terms, "demand response resources."^^ Under Order
745, aggregators that bundle demand reductions of individual residential
and commercial customers and bid them into wholesale markets must be
paid the same market price as generators, the locational marginal price
(^ LMP).^ '' An important qualifier is that aggregators are only compensated
when it is cost effective to do so. Each RTO or ISO must establish a net
benefits test^" designed to ascertain the price level at which DR bid into
the market will cost-effectively balance supply and demand.
There are two principal forms of DR: time-based (using varying rates
to prompt demand reductions) and incentive-based (using incentives to
reduce demand).'^ ^ DR programs are also distinguishable on the basis of
the signals that prompt reductions, either in response to the price of
electricity (economic DR), or to lower consumption at periods of high
stress on the grid (emergency DR).'^ ^
Emergency DR, used when grid reliability is jeopardized, has been the
most common form of DR to date.^ ^ It involves reducing consumption
at peak hours when electricity demand spikes. Demand for energy in
wholesale markets peaks on a limited number of days and times, most
notably in summer mid-day hours when air conditioning use is highest.
22. Order 745 defines "demand response resources" as entities with the capability of
providing DR services. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(5) (2010). This Article will use "aggregators"
instead, because it describes their activities better and avoids confusion between "demand
response" (activities reducing demand) and "demand response resources" (providers of DR).
23. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,659 n.5 (defining LMP as " . . . the price
calculated by the ISO or RTO at particular locations or electrical nodes or zones within
the ISO or RTO footprint . . . used as the market price to compensate generators"). See
infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of compensating
DRatLMP).
24. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,671.
25. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM, at v (2006) (hereinafter 2006 DoE DR
BENEFITS REPORT).
26. See, e.g., PETER CAPPERS ET AL.. DEMAND RESPONSE IN U.S. ELECTRICITY
MARKETS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 11-14 (2009), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMP/
reports/lbnl-2124e.pdf (describing specific economic and emergency DR programs in
eastem RTOs).
27. ld.a{\9.
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This problem will only get worse, as summer demand is expected to
grow faster than electricity demand as a whole.^ ^ Emergency DR is
designed to substitute negawatts at those peak hours for starting or using
another power plant to meet high demand.'^ ' Constimers typically receive
monetary incentives to take part in emergency DR programs. In return,
they allow utilities or authorized third parties to control specific
devices.''" A DR program of this sort might use sensors on large residential
appliances such as air conditioners or electric water heaters, controlled
over the Internet (often through a gateway to the house such as a
programmable thermostat"), that cycle devices back or off over a specific
time period in response to a signal to reduce demand.
An economic DR program uses similar control technologies, but
different signals and incentives. Instead of curtailing use when demand
spikes, the system bases its incentives on the real-time price of electricify.
Price signals allow consumers to modify their demand when the wholesale
market price is too high.''^  When prices reach high levels (which can be
set in system programming), a signal can be sent to cut controlled
devices back or off. With proper design, this does not involve sitting in
the dark without electricity for an entire day. The short-term reductions
from well-stmcttired DR programs would be imperceptible to most
consumers.
According to one recent study, well over 100 gigawatts of economic
DR is available nationwide.^^ This enormous amount is equivalent to
the capacity of hundreds of new fossil fuel-fired plants. The same report
observed that DR could reduce as much as 20% of the nation's electricity
demand.^'' Another analysis suggests that large reductions could come
from "residential and small commercial (i.e., mass market) customers,"
without adversely affecting their comfort level.^ ^ Yet, as Order 745
28. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVABLE POTENTIAL FROM
ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. (2010-2030) 7
(2009), available at http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx7Product
Id=000000000001016987.
29. FERC 2006 DR-AMI Report, supra note 6, at 59.
30. CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 19.
31. Eisen, supra note 8.
32. FERC 2006 DR-AM REPORT, supra note 6, at 51.
33. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND
RESPONSE POTENTIAL, at x-xii (2009), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-
reports/06-09-demand-response.pdf [hereinafter FERC 2009 DR Potential Report]; but
see Elec. Power Research Inst., supra note 28, at xxvii (estimating maximum achievable
DR in summer peak hours at 101 GW bv 20301
34. FERC 2009 DR POTENTIAL REPORT, supra note 33, at x.
35. PowerPoint: Mass Market Demand Response and Variable Generation Integration
Issues: A Scoping Study 5 (Peter Cappers et al., Envtl. Energy Tech. Div., Lawrence Berkeley
Nat'l Lab.) (on file with author) [hereinafter LBL 2011 DR-DG Integration Scoping
Study], available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/emp/reporep/lbnl-5063e-ppt.pdf
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notes, there has not been much economic DR activity so far.^ '' There are
many reasons for this, including FERC's perception that DR has been
undercompensated in wholesale markets.
Order 745 builds on the foundation of FERC's Order 719, which
required ISOs and RTOs to revise their tariffs and allow DR aggregator
participation in the wholesale markets.'" In tum. Order 719 was based
on the national policy established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that,
"unnecessary barriers to demand response participation in energy,
capacity and ancillary service markets shall be eliminated."''^
A. Potential Beneftts of Economic DR (Pricing, Reliability,
Environmental, Integrating Renewables)
Order 745 encourages DR by fixing the amount of its compensation at
the same level as generation resources. Its foundational assumption is
that DR is functionally comparable to generation.''^ Using this logic,
reducing demand for electricity by 1000 MWh is just as effective as
producing 1000 MWh of supply to meet demand. As Order 745 puts it,
"an increment of generation is comparable to a decrement of load for
36. CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 19; PowerPoint: 2011 Final Emergency Load
Management (ILR/DR) and Economic Demand Response Summary 2 (PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C. 2011) (on file with author), available at http://www.pjm.com/ markets-and-
operations/demand-response/~/media/markets-ops/dsr/2011 -final-energy-load-management-
and-economic-demand-response-summary.ashx (providing statistics on emergency DR
and noting that in 2011, "PJM had very limited Economic Demand Response activity").
37. Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed.
Reg. 64,100, 64,101 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (2012))
[hereinafter FERC Order 719]. Under Order 719, RTOs and ISOs were required to
permit aggregators to bid DR on behalf of their retail customers directly into the
wholesale energy market, unless a state law prevented it. Id.] see, e.g.. Midwest Indep.
Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 140 F.E.R.C. H 61,060 (2012) (FERC Order on an
Order 719 compliance filing by MISO RTO setting forth business practices for aggregators in
the markets MISO administers).
Notwithstanding Order 719, aggregators "still face significant institutional and regulatory
barriers in many regions of the United States." CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 26
(noting that states limit participation in wholesale markets by aggregators because PUCs
are "coneemed about the erosion of their authority to regulate the business and
operations of incumbent monopoly utilities and its infrastructure."); Ind. Util. Regulatory
Comm'n v. FERC, 668 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (overtuming an Indiana state law
precluding customers from enrolling with aggregators without the state commission's
prior approval). See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing state regulation of
aggregators).
38. 16 U.S.C. §2642(2006).
39. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,661.
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purposes of balancing supply and demand in the day-ahead and real-time
energy markets."''"
While DR is not energy, FERC views it as comparable because it benefits
wholesale energy markets. First, it can serve as a hedge against price
spikes. At present, wholesale markets are imperfect, because there is
little opportunify for demand to participate to balance them. This has led
to oversupply as a means of tamping down peaking prices.''^ As FERC
Chairman Jon Wellinghoff noted, there has been overbuilding of plants
that only run at peak hours. Wellinghoff observed that, this strictly supply-
side management strategy requires sufficient peaking capacify and reserve
margins to reliably meet the highest load on hot summer days when air
conditioners are stmggling to keep up, plus a contingency for outages
and other dismptive events.**^
DR's impact is greatest during peak hours when the cost of generation
is high and the supply curve is the steepest.'*'' By reducing demand at
those times, DR can offset the need to mn power plants that would be
extremely costly to mn at those peak hours.''^ Wholesale prices can
therefore be lower at peak times. Thus, DR can reduce market prices,
while mitigating generator market power by preventing generators from
earning far more than their costs of production at peak hours.''^  As FERC
puts it, DR, "helps to ensure the competitiveness of organized wholesale
energy markets and remove barriers to the participation of demand
response resources, thus ensuring just and reasonable wholesale rates."''^
DR can also improve the electric grid's reliabilify.''^  At peak times,
the grid is stressed. Like a mbber band stretched to the limit, supply is
strained to meet peak demand. Under certain circumstances, that strain
can cause service dismptions, such as forced outages or rolling blackouts.
DR is a safety valve that lessens system pressure. By giving RTOs and
ISOs another tool to reduce load and balance supply and demand, it
offers a service that generation alone cannot provide.'" To some, this
40. Wat 16,662.
41. Wat 16,660.
42. See Jon Wellinghoff & David L. Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of
Demand Response: The Second Half of the Wholesale Market Equation, 28 ENERGY L.J.
389, 393 (2007); Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 551.
43. Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 42, at 393.
44. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,664-65.
45. 2006 DoE DR BENEFITS REPORT, supra note 25, at vi.
46. Id.
47. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,658.
48. Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 42, at 410-11; 2006 DoE DR BENEFITS
REPORT, supra note 25, at vi.
49. For example, one commenter on Order 745 asserted that "the flmgibility of demand
response and generation output creates greater operational flexibility that, in tum, offers
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contribution to grid flexibility and resilience makes DR even more valuable
than an equivalent increase in generation.^" Not surprisingly, groups
representing generators see it differently, arguing that because DR does
not provide more supply to meet system demand, it simply "allows the
marginal electron to serve a different customer."^'
By reducing demand at specific peak fimes, DR can also have positive
environmental impacts. It can offset the need to construct and dispatch
polluting generation resources.^^ Power plants that run at peak times
(peaker plants) are ofren older, dirtier and less efficient fossil-fiiel burning
generation sources.^^ DR has fewer—or possibly none^of the adverse
impacts of generation, such as air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions,
and land and water use issues.^" However, current wholesale market
prices fail to intemalize these extemalities, so there is an improper incentive
to use pealcing plants instead of DR to meet increased demand. This has
led some to argue that DR should receive extra compensation because
wholesale prices "radically understate the full environmental and health
costs associated" with electricity generated from fossil fuels.'^
Finally, as the requirements of renewable portfolio standards and other
mandates will bring considerably more power generated from renewable
resources onto the grid in the next several decades, increased use of DR
can help integrate it into the grid.^ ^ Systems that produce power from
RTOs and ISOs multiple options to solve system issues both in energy and ancillary
service markets . . . " FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,662.
50. Id
51. Id
52. Rossi & Hutton, supra note 9, at 46 (noting that, "[DR] also can advance values
associated with conservation and environmental protection, insofar as reductions in demand
may allow plants to operate at more efficient levels, or make new the construction of
new facilities unnecessary.").
53. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,664.
54. One exception would be demand reductions by switching to behind-the-meter
generation that runs on fossil fuel sources. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
55. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,664.
56. See generally JOSEPH H. ETO ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., USE OF
FREQUENCY RESPONSE METRICS TO ASSESS THE PLANNING AND OPERATING REQUIREMENTS
FOR RELIABLE INTEGRATION OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE GENERATION (2010) [hereinafter
"LBNL REGULATION REPORT"], available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/
reliability/frequencyresponsemetrics-report.pdf
The connection between DR, DG, and frequency regulation is discussed further in Joel
B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, "Virtual Power Plants, " and the Smart Grid, 1
ENVTL. & ENERGY L . & P O L ' Y J . 191 (2013).
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renewable resources typically supply power intermittently.^^ This can
create additional balancing challenges for RTOs and ISOs that must deal
with the on-again, off-again nature of these resources.'^ The managerial
challenge is exacerbated by the requirement of frequency regulation: the
electric grid must always be kept in frequency balance between supply
and demand in real time, within specific narrow limits.^'
At present, there is no viable means of large-scale storage to serve as a
safety valve for regulating the grid.*^ " However, DR can step into the
gap. A recent FERC analysis found that DR could play an important role
in maintaining frequency regulation.*' It can be deployed immediately,
and does not have the time lag—however small it might be in some
cases—that occurs when a grid operator orders the startup of a power
plant.*^ Large-scale deployment of DR can therefore give RTOs and
ISOs a tool to "quickly respond to changes in variable generation output
without placing undue sfrain on the power system."*^
B. Economic DR Participation in Wholesale Energy Markets
Economic DR can take place in today's electric grid under two different
scenarios. First, retail distribution utilities could modify their rates to
provide incentives to consumers for reducing their electricity demand.
For example, a state could set a dynamic pricing stmcture that rewards
demand reduction. Dynamic pricing is the term for the various mechanisms
to change electricity prices in real time to mirror changes in marginal
wholesale costs. Under dynamic pricing, consumers would buy electricity
up to the point where its marginal cost exceeded its marginal utility to
them.
However, dynamic pricing is not the norm across the nation, as there
is a ftindamental disconnect between the wholesale and retail electricity
markets. '^' In theory, consumers could reduce their electricity use directly
57. ANDRES CARVALLO & JOHN COOPER, THE ADVANCED SMART GRID: EDGE POWER
DRIVING SUSTAINABILITY 18 (2011).
58. See generally LBNL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 56 (discussing this challenge
and strategies to address it).
59. Paul L. Joskow, Creating a Smarter U.S. Electricity Grid, 26 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 29,33 (2012).
60. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., ACCOMMODATING HIGH LEVELS OF VARIABLE
GENERATION, at i (2009), available at http://www.nerc.eom/files/l VGTF_Report_041609.pdf
61. LBNL REGULATION REPORT, 5upra note 56, at xviii.
62. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 60, at iii.
63. Id.
64. SEVERIN BORENSTBIN, ENERGY INST. AT HAUSS, EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE
ADOPTION OF OPT-IN RESIDENTIAL DYNAMIC ELECTRICITY PRICING 2 (2012), available at
http://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/pdf/working_papers/WP229.pdf; FERC Order 745, supra note 10,
at 16,667.
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in response to wholesale market price signals. That is impossible for
most residential and small commercial consumers, who are insulated
from the wholesale market price of electricity. They typically pay a
fixed retail price per kilowatt-hour (kWh), set by state public utility
commissions (PUCs).^^ These static retail tariffs do not vary with the
time of day, real time wholesale price, or any other variable. Thus, if
wholesale prices spike, there is no direct impact on constimers, who
have no market-based incentive to reduce their consumption or to take
part in a DR program. No matter how much one consumes, the price of
power will not change and the marginal cost of each unit of electricity
remains the **^
I. Demand Response Firms (Aggregators) and Their Relationship
With Wholesale Energy Markets
The second model of economic DR involves organizing consumers as
a group, bidding their aggregated reductions as a resource into the
wholesale markets. By pulling together demand reductions from a number
of retail customers, an aggregator enables individual customers to take
part in the market when they otherwise could not do so. Most residential
customers cannot interact directly with the wholesale markets, as market
mies in RTOs and ISOs require small-scale customers to do so through
licensed intermediaries.''^ The fundamental idea of curtailing an amount
of demand larger than that of a typical household is not new. A
traditional use of emergency DR going back several decades involves
contracts between large industrial or cotnmercial customers—such as
major manufacturing facilities—and their utilities directly to allow the
utilities to curtail their electricity use when necessary to balance the grid.
Order 745 applies only to aggregators, not to any state program that
regulates consumers directly.*^ A wholly new business sector has arisen
65. BORENSTEIN, ENERGY INST. AT HAUSS, supra note 64, at 2.
66. Id.
67. As an example, the minimum individual or aggregated curtailment that may be
bid into the PJM RTO's markets is 100 kW, larger than the amount that could be
provided by any single residential customer. See, e.g., PJM INTERCONNECTION, L . L . C ,
AMENDED AND RESTATED OPERATING AGREEMENT OF PJM INTERCONNECTION 11 I.5A.9
(2013) ("Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Market Participation"), available at http://www.
pjm.coni/documents/~/media/documents/agreements/oa.ashx.
68. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,660 (stating that, "While a number of
states and utilities are pursuing retail-level price-responsive demand initiatives based on
dynamic and time-differentiated retail prices and utility investments in demand response
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in the electricify market in recent years, in which firms such as EnerNOC,
Comverge, and Viridity^' serve as intermediaries to the wholesale
markets.™ They work with commercial customers to manage their electricify
usage and handle the mechanics of bidding DR into the wholesale markets.
Their portfolios to date typically consist of DR under contract with business
and commercial customers. As noted above, these customers have a
tradition of working with utilities to curtail electricify use on demand, so
they are typically more familiar with DR and comfortable with it than
residential customers.
In the past few years, these companies have begun to market to the
retail electricity sector,^' offering products and services tailored to
households. The larger players in this sector are gradually becoming
familiar to more customers, although their reach in the residential sector
is still relatively small. Some firms operate in partnership with utilities,^^
but others operate independently.
Each demand response firm has its own proprietary hardware and
software system that manages price signals and demand reductions.
Typically, the company offers a means for the consumer to finance and
install the system, and a technological solution designed to manage and
control the response to price signals. So, for example, a program might
allow a consumer to set a programmable thermostat to reduce demand of
specific devices at given price levels. The technology might allow
enabling technologies, these are state efforts, and, thus, are not the subject of this
proceeding"). See infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Order
745 on existing state programs).
69. ENERNOC, http://www.enemoc.com (last visited Aug. 29, 2012); COMVERGE,
http://www.comverge.com (last visited Aug. 29, 2012); VIRIDITY ENERGY, http://viridityenergy.
com (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
70. WARD JEWELL ET AL.. POWER SYS. ENG'G RESEARCH CTR., FUTURE GRID: THE
ENVIRONMENT 22-23 (2012), available at http://www.pserc.wisc.edu/documents/
publications/papers/fgwhitepapers/Jewell_PSERC_Future_Grid_White_Paper_Environm
ent_May_2012_Final.pdf (mentioning Comverge and EnerNOC and noting that, "to
manage interactions with the system operator and participation in electricity markets,
load aggregators have the ability to act as an intermediary between the operators and
individual customers.").
71. Gene Wolf, Targeting the Customer, TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION WORLD
(May 1, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://tdworld.com/demandresponse/smart-meter-demand-
response-050112/ (noting that, "aggregators offer residential and small commercial
customers the same energy audits and smart building technologies that have long been
available to large commercial and industrial (C&l) customers.").
72. Id. (noting that, "savvy utilities . . . are partnering with third-party DR
providers"). Each of Califomia's three largest investor-owned utilities has partnered
with an aggregator to deliver DR services. See generally DULANE MORAN & JUN SUZUKI,
RESEARCH INTO ACTION, INC., CURTAILMENT SERVICE PROVIDERS: THEY BRING THE
HORSE TO WATER... DO WE CARE IF IT DRINKS? (2010), available at http://www.
aceee.org/files/proceedings/2010/data/papers/2066.pdf (discussing the experience to date
with these partnerships).
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consumers to retain some control (f^r example, the ability to override a
setting and leave an air conditioning unit on when household temperature
reaches a prescribed level).
Empowering consumers to reduce consumption in response to price
signals could be enormously beneficial. It would create a historic shift
in the electricity system from its current left to right orientation, as
consumers would have far more interaction with the entities that serve
them. This is no small matter. It cDuld empower consumers to control
their own energy ftiture, helping them become more famihar with changing
their consumption and seeing how that translates into savings. It also
gives them a chance to understand and use energy-saving technologies
as aggregators deploy those solutions.
2. Challenges of Aggregation
However, there are concems with this model of DR. Aggregating a
resource and then bidding it into the wholesale markets is a complex
endeavor that requires care in selecting customers and working with
them. To be fiinctionally the same as generation, aggregators must be
able to sustain and control demand reductions for extended periods of
time. Like Lucy yanking the footbal! away from Charlie Brown, it would
not be useful to the wholesale market to offer a specific level of demand
reduction, only to have it last for mere minutes. Some commenters of
Order 745 claimed that DR only provides short-term negawatts, while
generators can be dispatched by an RTO or ISO to balance the grid for
longer periods of time."
Another issue is ensuring that "real" demand reduction takes place.
The first aspect of this involves fixing the baseline for electricity
consumption from which the demand reduction is measured.^'' Because
little economic DR has taken place, there is no record of success in ensuring
that baselines are set accurately. Measuring and verifying that real
demand reductions from the baseline are achieved is another important
challenge.^^
73. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,662.
74. Id at 16,672.
75. Id. If demand is merely time-shifted, there is no real reduction. See, e.g.,
JEWELL ET AL.. POWER SYS. ENG'G RESEARCH CTR., supra note 70, at 24 (stating that, "[t]he
environmental benefits of demand response depend on whether energy consumption is
actually reduced, or delayed to a later time."j.
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One measurement problem identified by Order 745's opponents is the
use of "behind the meter" generation to achieve demand reduction. In
this scenario, a commercial or manufacturing facility with a backup
generator located on its premises offers to "reduce" the amount of electricify
that it purchases. It then substitutes the power it generates on site—and
not measured by the utilify, hence the term "behind the rneter"—for the
power it would otherwise purchase, thereby getting paid for the ostensibly
reduced demand while still consuming as much power as before. Worse
yet, if the on-site generator is a polluting unit, the environmental benefits
of DR are diminished. FERC, however, does not distinguish among DR
resources in deciding which are compensated.'^
Much of this might be addressed by state regulation of aggregators'
practices. For example, a state in which an aggregator does business
might establish best practices for defining demand reductions, and perhaps
establish the right to periodic inspections. Some states have attempted to
regulate aggregators in the same manner as utilities or other electricity
suppliers.'^ Order 745 does not explicitly preclude this. However, if a
state imposes what FERC perceives as onerous regulations to hamper the
growth of the DR sector, it may challenge them. In 2012, the D.C. Circuit
refused to allow Indiana state regulators to bar customers from enrolling
with aggregators without the state's prior approval.'^
76. See, e.g.. Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy
Markets, 137 F.E.R.C. H 61,215 at 66 (Dec. 15, 2011) (clarifying, in the context of an
order denying rehearing on Order 745, that FERC believes there is no distinction among
DR resources, whether or not they are behind the meter, because the impact on wholesale
markets is the same); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 140 F.E.R.C.
1[ 61,059 at 29 (July 19, 2012) [hereinafter, FERC Order on MISO Order 745 Compliance
Filing] (noting that, "Order No. 745 focused exclusively on the amount of payment
demand response would receive and did not require any changes with respect to whether
load relying on behind-the-meter generation would be entitled to demand response
compensation.").
77. See, e.g.. An Investigation of the Regulation of Curtailment Service Providers,
Case No. 9241, Order No. 84275 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Aug. 22, 2011), http://web
app.psc.state.md.us/IIntrane/Maillog/orders_new.cfc (Maryland PSC order requiring
curtailment service providers operating in PJM to register with the PSC).
78. See Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm'n v. FERC, 668 F.3d 735 (D.C. Circ. 2012)
(where the D.C. Circuit sided with FERC after it approved a PJM tariff that allowed
aggregators to put the burden on regulated utilities to demonstrate that customers were
ineligible for aggregation, effectively overriding the Indiana state commission order
enjoining retail customers in Indiana fi"om selling DR in the wholesale market without
the lURC's prior approval).
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III. THE CONTROVERSY OVER COMPENSATING DR AND
GENERATION EQUALLY
Order 745 provides for a uniform level of payment for the DR resource
that aggregators bid into wholesale energy markets. Before Order 745,
RTOs and ISOs showed wide variety in their compensation of DR, with
most generally paying aggregators at a lower rate than generators.^^ The
biggest challenge for FERC was determining the appropriate level of
compensation for aggregators, while continuing to promote the economic
goal of lower electricity prices for retail consumers. Without adequate
compensation, aggregators have insufficient economic incentives to enter
the market. If compensation is too high, prices would not be kept down,
and aggregators would unbalance the market.
A. The Requirement of Payment of LMP, and Arguments
For and Against
FERC's response in Order 745 was to level the playing field by
requiring that aggregators be paid for reducing demand at the same
market price as generators that supply power. While RTOs and ISOs
give this rate different names, the mechanism of calculating it is effectively
the same: "locational marginal pricing" (LMP). LMP is a marginal cost
pricing mechanism under which, "the price to withdraw electric power . . .
at each location in the grid at any given time reflects the cost of making
available an additional unit of electric power for purchase at that
location and time."^" LMP is not equal to the marginal cost of a specific
individual generator. Nor is it equal to the marginal cost of the least
expensive generator not currently dispatched on the system. Instead, it
is the price at specific locations of the grid at specific times, with factors
79. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,661 (stating that, "the Commission has
allowed each RTO and ISO to develop its own compensation methodologies for demand
response resources participating in its day-ahead and real-time energy markets. As a
result, the levels of compensation for demand response vary significantly among RTOs
and ISOs.").
80. ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 58 (2006),
available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf; see also
William W. Hogan, Getting the Prices Right in PJM: Analysis and Summary: April 1998
through March 1999, The First Anniversary of Full Locational Pricing (Apr. 2, 1999)
(unpublished note) (on file with author), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/who
gan/pjmO399.pdf (early discussion of the LMP concept and its implementation in PJM
by major academic proponent).
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such as the cost of transmission congestion included. As FERC explains
in Order 745, it is "the price calculated by the ISO or RTO at particular
locations or electrical nodes or zones within the ISO or RTO footprint
and . . . used as the market price to compensate generators."^'
In Order 745, FERC found that payment of LMP to aggregators would
compensate them, "in a manner that refiect[s] the marginal value of the
[DR] resource to each RTO and ISO."*^ FERC qualified this by directing
RTOs and ISOs to establish net benefits tests that approximate price
levels at which DR will be cost-effective, to be updated monthly as
historical data and supply conditions change.^ ^ Some RTOs and ISOs
have already complied with this directive, establishing tests that FERC
has approved.^'' By using the net benefits test, FERC sought to ensure
"that the overall benefit of the reduced LMP that results from dispatching
demand response resources exceeds the cost of dispatching and paying
LMP to those resources."^^ To achieve this. Order 745 specifies that
aggregators should only be paid LMP when it is cost-effective to do so
under a net benefits test.^ *"
FERC's choice to compensate DR at LMP has generated intense
controversy, even with the net benefits test's circuit-breaker-like protection.
Opponents argue that payment of LMP to aggregators sends the wrong
market signal because it overcompensates those who reduce consumption.^ ^
Under this argument, consumers receive a windfall because they are paid
twice. They reduce their consumption, saving an amount they would
otherwise pay at the retail rate for purchasing generation (G), and receive
the LMP as well (for a total of LMP+G). For example, a consumer
would both save the cost of tuming on the lights, and be paid the LMP
for not ttiming them on. Opponents find it incomprehensible that any
rational person would fail to understand this.^ ^ The proposed remedy,
outlined in FERC Cotnmissioner Moeller's vigorous dissent to Order 745,
81. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,6559 n.5.
82. W. at 16,666.
83. Wat 16,659.
84. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 137 F.E.R.C. 1[ 61,212 at 36
(2011) (approving the MISO RTO's net benefits test, with requests for clarifications);
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C, 137 F.E.R.C. \ 61,216 at 2 (2011) (approving the PJM
RTO's net benefits test).
85. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,659.
86. Id. at 16,666.
87. See Brief of Petitioners at 45-50, Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, No. II-
1486 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 23, 2011).
88. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Primer on Demand Response and a Critique
of FERC Order 745, GEO. WASH. UNIV. J. OF ENERGY AND ENV. LAW 102, 104-05 (2012)
(stating that, "I have long been puzzled by the apparent inability of many smart people to
understand that compensating some entity for producing a negawatt is inappropriate and
involves simple double-counting.").
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would be to subtract the retail rate, and compensate aggregators at LMP
minus G (LMP-G).
Opponents also point to a cost associated with paying DR at LMP,
known as the "missing money" or "billing unit effect" problem. The
amount of load that pays LMP, after DR is figured in, is less than the
total of resources (DR and generation) dispatched in real time to provide
service. FERC describes this as follows: "Depending on the change in
LMP relative to the size of the energy market, dispatching demand response
resources may result in an increased cost per unit ($/MWh) to the remaining
wholesale load associated with the decreased amount of load paying the
bill."^^
Consider a simplified example with 100 MW of demand on the system,
and 10% ofthat demand (10 MW) withdrawn by a DR aggregator that is
compensated at LMP for doing so.''" At that point, consumers of the
remaining 90 MW of load are asked to pay for 100 MW of "supply," of
which 10 MW is DR. They either pay the prevailing price for the 90 MW,
in which case compensation for 10 MW is "missing," or the system
adjusts prices in real time to "settle" the 10 MW deviation and recalculate
the price at a higher price per unit. Generation, by contrast, does not
produce the billing unit effect because it does not decrease load." RTOs
and ISOs have begun to address how those costs might be recovered,
with the preferred approach being allocation system-wide to all loads, on
the theory that DR's benefits are system-wide.'^
89. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,659.
90. This example is adapted from DONALD J. SIPE, PRETIFLAHERTY, INTEGRATION
OF DEMAND RESPONSE INTO DAY AHEAD MARKETS: A SUPPLY SIDE APPROACH 4-6
(2010). In this article, Sipe proposes a revised pricing algorithm, using commitments in
the day-ahead markets, to solve the "missing lrioney" problem.
91. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,666 n. 118.
92. WILLIAM W. HOGAN, DEMAND RESPONSE COMPENSATION, NET BENEFITS AND
COST ALLOCATION: PRELIMINARY COMMENTS 6 (2010) [hereinafter HOGAN 2010 DR
TECHNICAL CONFERENCE COMMENTS] (arguing that in some cases, "part of the cost
recovery would be separate from the allocation to the load serving entity. In this case the
benefits would presumably be widely shared, and the costs should be recovered from a
broader group, typically all loads.").
In Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 140 F.E.R.C. H 61,060 at 80
(2012), FERC noted that, "in Order No. 745, the Commission determined that it is just
and reasonable to allocate the costs associated with demand response compensation
proportionally to all entities that purchase from the relevant energy market in the area(s)
where the demand response reduces the market in the area(s) where the demand response
reduces energy at the time the demand response resource is committed or dispatched."
FERC rejected M ISO's proposed cost allocation formula. Id.
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This has led some observers to claim that the cost of paying LMP—
particularly during off-peak hours—might outweigh the savings created
by DR. To opponents, it is difficult if not impossible to design a net
benefits test that reduces the added cost and, "minimizes any opportunities
for distorting market prices or exploiting market inefficiencies."''' In
this view, the net benefits test is neither an appropriate element of a
liquid market, nor a solution to the real problem of DR overcompensation.
They argue it is unworkable and so novel that it would "reduce competition,
have a 'chilling effect' on the development of demand response, and be
costly and complex to implement."'''
However, compensating DR at LMP-G might price aggregators out of
the market before they even gained traction, as G is a large component
of the energy price. It would also create an administrative burden on
ISOs and RTOs, which would have to match each kWh of electricify to
the location where it would be sold, and apply the prevailing retail price.
Maine attorney Donald Sipe, who represents DR providers and has
issued a number of "white papers" on the subject,'^ argues that
compensating DR at LMP-G impermissibly exalts the efficiency of
wholesale markets in trading energy at the lowest possible price over the
achievement of other societal goals. To him, providing "safe and reliable
service at just and reasonable rates" requires allowing competition at the
market price to select the optimal amount of DR based on consumers'
preferences. Any other market design, such as LMP-G, is "an anti-
competitive restriction on trade."'^
Sipe's argument reflects the fact that Order 745 does create winners
and losers. Increased participation of DR in wholesale markets would
pay consumers at the expense of electricify generators. They stand to
lose market share, particularly in the hours when prices spike, which can
be the most profitable." The prospect of a large transfer of wealth from
generators to consumers is an important factor in understanding the
arguments for and against Order 745.
An additional argument for payment of full LMP, as noted above, is
that it corrects the mispricing of environmental externalities in the
wholesale markets.'^ FERC's opponents acknowledge that wholesale
93. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,665.
94. Id.
95. SIPE, PRETIFLAHERTY, supra note 90; DONALD J. SIPE, PRETIFLAHERTY, DEFINING
THE PRODUCT: MARKET THEORY FOR AN ESSENTIAL SERVICE AND THE PROPER ROLE OF
DEMAND RESPONSE (2010).
96. SIPE, PRETIFLAHERTY, supra note 90, at 36.
97. See Katherine Tweed, Demand Response Providers Take on Generators,
GREENTECH MEDIA (June 2, 2011), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/
demand-response-providers-take-on-generators/.
98. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,662.
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markets do not properly price environmental extemalities.'^ However,
they reject this as a jusfification for pricing DR at LMP, viewing a
carbon tax as the optimal solution. In a recent critique of Order 745,
Robert Borlick argued that environmental extemalities should be addressed
through a carbon surcharge, and compared doing so by compensating
DR at LMP to "surgery with a meat ax—the patient is more likely to die
than be cured."'""
A carbon tax or across-the board carbon regulation might well be an
effective way to incorporate environmental extemalities into wholesale
electricity prices.'"' Depending on its design, a carbon tax would
presumably increase pricing for fossil friel fired generation across the
board. Generators would intemalize the tax in the price at which they
offered electricity to the wholesale markets, and their bids would be used
to clear the market, depending on where they fell in the dispatch order.
However, FERC could not intervene in the wholesale markets to impose
a carbon tax, as it does not have the authority under the FPA to do so.
Regulatory authorities outside of FERC would have to act.
To Order 745's opponents, this means environmental extemalities
should be addressed in another forum, not FERC's rules goveming the
wholesale markets' design. Critics of this position claim that paying
LMP is a pragmatic second best solution to intemalizing extemalities.
In response to Borlick's critique of Order 745, Flak and Rosenzweig
observe, "(1) FERC isn't about to [explicitly monetize externalities] any
time soon; and (2) in the absence of doing so, economic analysts should
99. See, e.g.. Pierce, supra note 88, at 106-07; Robert Borlick, Paying for Demand
Response at the Wholesale Level: The Small Consumers ' Perspective, 24 THE ELECTRICITY J.
8,11(2011).
100. Borlick, supra note 99, at 11.
101. Pierce, supra note 88, at 107 (claiming that, "the most effective response to
this problem would be to implement a form of govemment intervention that would
require generators to intemalize this social cost through a well-designed cap-and-trade
system or a large carbon tax.").
The EPA's proposal for New Source Performance Standards under the Clean Air Act
would impose an output-based standard for carbon dioxide and effectively force the
construction of a generation of new, cleaner power plants. Standards of Performance for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (;to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60);
see also Adam James & Jorge Madrid, Carbon Limits Will Help Fix a Broken Energy
Market and Spur Economic Growth: Benefits of EPA 's Proposed Carbon Pollution Rule,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 7, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/
news/2012/06/07/11678/carbon-limits-will-help-fix-a-broken-energy-market-and-spur-
economic-growth/.
take these unpriced [environmental] extemalities into effect when
calculating the efficiency of any particular policy."'"^
B. Arguments For Federal Authority Over DR
We return to the central question: can FERC use its authority to
promote societal preferences other than fostering a wholesale market
that offers electricity generation supply at the lowest possible cost? The
touchstone for this is the familiar "just and reasonable" authority of FPA
Section 205, which provides in part that:
All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or
in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or
pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable, and any such
rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.'"^
Using this authority, for example, FERC requires "public utilities"'"'' to
file tariffs outlining the rates, terms and conditions for interstate electricity
transmission and wholesale electricity sales.'"^
1. DR Is Not a "Sale " But It "Affects or Pertains To "
Wholesale Rates
FERC's authority extends to the "transmission or sale" of electric
energy at wholesale. An aggregator's offer of DR promises a specific
amount of negawatts, so it is not a sale.'"* However, FERC also has
102. Jonathan Falk & Michael Rosenzweig, Response from Jonathan Falk and Michael
Rosenzweig: Critique Betrays Misperception of Purpose of Demand Response, 24 THE
ELEC.J. 19,21 (2011).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
104. The Federal Power Act's definition of a "public utility" is not the same as the
common understanding of a "utility." The Act defines a "public utility" as "any person
who owns or operates facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission," that is,
"any person who owns or operates" facilities for the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.
16 U.S.C. §824(e) (2006).
FERC does not claim that aggregators are public utilities subject to its Section 205
authority simply because they engage in transactions in the wholesale market. To claim
otherwise would require FERC to claim that DR is energy. See U.S. Dep't of Energy,
supra note 3.
105. See, e.g., PSEG Energy Res. & Trade L.L.C. v. FERC, 665 F. 3d 203 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (upholding a challenge to FERC's revisions of the ISO-NE forward capacity
auction tariff, filed under Section 205 authority).
106. See Opening Brief of Petitioners at 28-29, Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC,
No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. filed June 6, 2012).
In the aftermath of the Califomia electricity crisis of 2000, FERC took the position
that DR was a sale. Removing Obstacles to Increased Electric Generation and Natural
Gas Supply in the Westem United States, 94 F.E.R.C. 1| 61,272 at 61,972 (2001), affd
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authority over matters "affecting or pertaining to" wholesale prices. DR
is an example of this, as it changes the market's overall pricing stmcture
by serving as a balancing mechanism. Using the example of the Califomia
electricity crisis of 2000, Professor Richard Pierce explains that a market
operator can infuse DR into the system to bring demand down and reduce
spiking wholesale prices.'"' That option is a means of risk protection for
the entire market.'"^
The D.C. Circuit's opinion in California Independent System Operator v.
FERC {CAISOy°'' sheds light on the interpretation of Section 205. In
that 2004 decision, the D.C. Circuit concluded that FERC lacked authorify
to order the Califomia ISO to replace its goveming board in the aftermath of
the Califomia electricity crisis."" FERC argued that the CAISO's state
appointed board was not independent of market participants, as FERC's
restructuring Orders require.'" It claimed that "the composition of the
goveming board of a utility and the method of its selection is a 'practice
. . . affecting [a] rate'"' '^  and subject to FERC regulation. The D.C. Circuit
disagreed."-* It noted that it had previously rejected FERC's suggestion
in City of Cleveland v. FERC^^'* that it could regulate an "infinitude of
practices affecting rates and service.""^ Instead, it recited the standard
on reh'g, 95 F.E.R.C. % 61,225 (2001), ajf'don reh'g, 96 F.E.R.C. % 61,155 (2001); PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C, 99 F.E.R.C. 11 61,139 at 61,573 (2002). However, in Order 745,
FERC referenced its more recent EnergyConnect decision, and stated that it no longer
thinks of a DR bid as a resale of energy. FERC Order 745, supra note 10 at 16,668
(citing EnergyConnect, 130 F.E.R.C. 1[ 61,031 at 31 (2010) (defming DR not as a "sale
or resale of energy that would normally be consumed by an end-use consumer," but as a
reduction in consumption by consumers in response to a price signal or incentive
payment)).
107. Pierce, supra note 88, at 103 (noting that, "the failure to provide incentives for
any demand response in the Califomia retail electricity market had catastrophic results
for the wholesale electricity market that serves Califomia").
108. David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 765, 814(2008).
109. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
110. / ¿ a t 398.
111. Id.
112. /i/. at 399.
113. Id. at 403; see also Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 42, at 404.
114. City of Cleveland v. FERC, 773 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
115. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 401 ("FERC apparently would
have us hold that the existence of an 'infinitude' of practices supposes that there is also
an infinitude of acceptable definitions for what constitutes a 'practice' to give it the
authority to regulate anything done by or connected with a regulated utility, as any act or
aspect of such an entity's corporate existence could affect, in some sense, the rates. We
are not biting.").
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set forth by then-Judge Scalia in City of Cleveland, under which FERC
can regulate "only those practices that affect rates and service[s]
significantly, that are realistically susceptible of specification, and that
are not so generally understood in any contractual arrangement as to
render recitation superfluous.""^
Former FERC Commissioner William Massey discussed the meaning
of "significantly" in a 2004 article on potential national reliabilify standards
for the electric grid."^ At the time, FERC had no authorify to develop
such standards, and a significant debate was ongoing about FERC's FPA
authorify to impose mandatory standards on market participants. Massey
concluded that reliability standards would affect rates significanfly.'
As he pointed out, rehabilify standards have direct system-wide implications
that affect rates and other jurisdictional matters.
While the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and subsequent developments
rendered that particular issue moot,"^ Massey's argument applies equally
here. Promoting an entire new class of market participants so fundamentally
affects the markets that FERC can regulate their activities. As the overseer
of RTOs and ISOs, FERC has approval authority over their wholesale
markets. It is the markets' creator and could withdraw approval of the
markets entirely if it so chose.'^" It follows that it can make sweeping
changes to require RTOs and ISOs to gain experience with DR and
116. City of Cleveland, ITi F.2d at 1376.
117. William L. Massey et al., Reliability-Based Competition In Wholesale Electricity:
Legal and Policy Perspectives, 25 ENERGY L.J. 319, 328-31 (2004).
118. Id.
119. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 added a new Section 215 to the Federal Power
Act, giving FERC an explicit role in the development of reliability standards. That
section ended the voluntary reliability standards regime, and provided for the creation of
a national "Electric Reliability Organization" (ERO) to establish and enforce FERC-
approved mandatory reliability standards. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
58, § 121 l(b), 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(2) (2006)); Mandatory
Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power System, 72 Fed. Reg. 16,416-01 (Apr. 4, 2007)
(codified as 18 C.F.R. § 40 (2012)); 18 C.F.R. § 40.2 (2012) (making approved reliability
standards mandatory); see, e.g., Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, L.L.C. v. Shumlin, 838 F.
Supp. 2d 183, 193 (D. Vt. 2012) (the grid "must meet mandatory reliability standards").
120. Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 42, at 558 (noting that, "FERC oversees
these markets, approving tariffs and market rules, and because RTOs are regulatory
animals, the FERC can actually take away approval for their operation. In this sense,
RTOs are the FERC's agents, because that is where their power is derived."); see, e.g.,
Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC, 616 F.3d 520, 522-24 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (approving
redesign of the Califomia ISO market, including the use of LMP).
Conn. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 484 F.3d 558, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
relied upon by Order 745's opponents, does not change this outcome. In that case, FERC
claimed jurisdiction to review a filing on generation resource adequacy by ISO New England.
Id. ln response to a challenge to its jurisdiction under Section 205, FERC abandoned its
position and asserted that Section 201 conferred jurisdiction. Id. The D.C. Circuit criticized
this as a new and unsupportable argument. Id. Thus, it did not decide the underlying
issue of whether FERC had Section 205 authority over the issue.
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reverse the lack of participation by aggregators in wholesale markets.'^'
Standards for DR compensation have direct system-wide effects on
wholesale rates. They are more similar to the restructuring Orders approved
in New York v. FERC and reliability standards, than to the corporate
govemance issues discussed in CAISO that bear a much more tangential
relationship to the market as a whole.'^^ The City of Cleveland standard
"provides an adequate safeguard against overreaching" if FERC decided to
regulate less significant matters such as the price of shoes, thinking it
"affected" wholesale rates.'"
Previous D.C. Circuit decisions support FERC's position.'^'' The D.C.
Circuit has stated that FERC is entitled to great deference when it engages
in fundamental reworking of the wholesale market design. When FERC
creates policies aimed at all participants, "agency discretion is at its
zenith."'" The D.C. Circuit has frequenfly sided with FERC when it is
choosing between competing predictions of how a market will work in
the future, after a change in market design.'^^ FERC believes that
121. Any such decision would be subject to the typical limitations of administrative
law (for example, the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard on judicial review of a
FERC decision).
122. The CAISO court observed that New York v. FERC is not directly relevant to
this point, because it did not require the utilities to change any "practice" thought to
"affect" rates, but simply required jurisdictional utilities to file tariffs. Cal. Indep. Sys.
Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Transmission Access
Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). One could just as easily
conclude that because DR compensation will be changed via tariff filings, it has the same
effect.
123. Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 42, at 404; see Opening Brief of Petitioners,
supra note 106, at 32-33. For those with memories of the decade-long experience with
restructuring the electric grid, this slippery slope argument is all too familiar.
124. Detroit Edison Co. v. FERC, 334 F.3d 48, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("FERC's
interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction is entitled to Chevron deference.").
125. Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 42, at 409 (noting FERC's "broad
remedial authority"); see, e.g., Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC, 616 F.3d 520, 541
(D.C. Cir. 2010) ("When reviewing FERC's selection of a remedy, we give the Commission
'great deference'"); La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FERC, 522 F.3d 378, 393 (D.C. Cir.
2008); Towns of Concord, Norwood, & Wellesley v. FERC, 955 F.2d 67, 76 (D.C. Cir.
1992) ("[a]gency discretion is often at its zenith" when the agency is fashioning remedies).
126. See, e.g., Envtl. Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
("[l]t is within the scope of the agency's expertise to make such a prediction about the
market it regulates, and a reasonable prediction deserves our deference notwithstanding
that there might also be another reasonable view.").
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compensating DR at LMP will not cause price spikes, and that view is
entitled to "great deference"'" over opponents' competing claims.
2. The Interplay Between Section 205 Jurisdiction and State Regulatory
Authority Does Not Preclude FERC's Authority Over DR
Order 745 states that "jurisdiction over demand response is a complex
matter that lies at the confluence of state and federal jurisdiction."'^^ DR
requires decisions about consumption undertaken by retail customers
who are subject to state regulation. This leads opponents to conclude that
Order 745 impacts retail rates, intmding on the states' sole jurisdiction.'^'
Economist Robert Borlick claims that DR is "inherently a retail product
because it can be coordinated solely by energy market price signals"'''"
and only becomes a wholesale product when an aggregator offers it into the
wholesale energy market.'-" Opponents also raise a preemption argument,
asserting that Order 745 will quash states' DR programs. Yet neither of
these should preclude federal regulation.
Understanding the first argument requires attention to how state PUCs
calculate retail electricity rates. They begin by determining fixed and
operating costs for a regulated utilify, then sum these into a "revenue
requirement" that fixes the total amount of revenue the utilify must eam
to receive a prescribed rate of retum. Rates are then calculated by dividing
the total revenue by kWh of electricity sold to yield prices per kWh, with
prices then set at that level. If an aggregator bids 1000 MWh into the
wholesale market, and that bid is accepted, less electricity is sold at
retail, impacting the utility's revenue. That is of course an intended impact
of DR (less electricify sold), but does not lessen the fact that it also affects
retail rates.
In New York v. FERC, the landmark Supreme Court decision upholding
FERC's Orders that restmctured the national electricity market,'^^ the
Supreme Court carefully observed that the FPA "limitfs] FERC's sale
127. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 400 F.3d 23, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("The court
properly defers to policy determinations invoking the Commission's expertise in evaluating
complex market conditions.").
128. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,676.
129. HOGAN 2010 DR TECHNICAL CONFERENCE COMMENTS, supra note 92, at 2,-4.
130. Borlick, MADRI Presentation, supra note 2, at 5-6. In roughly half the nation,
DR is done at the retail level only. FERC has no authority over DR in the half of the
nation in which utilities do not purchase power at wholesale in organized markets.
Individual load-serving entities (utilities and energy suppliers in deregulated states, or
LSEs) are responsible for DR in those states, and subject to state regulatory authority
only.
131. W. at6.
132. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2001).
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jurisdiction to that at wholesale."'''^ Retail sales are still subject to state
jurisdiction.''''' However, the Court established that if FERC has the
authority to regulate, it could do so even if its policy has impacts at the
retail level.
New York v. FERC is best remembered for approving FERC's
expansive view of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court pointed to "dramatic
changes in the power industry that have occurred in recent decades,"'^^
as the electric grid has become more interconnected, the movement of
electricity increasingly links the wholesale and retail levels. The Court
upheld FERC's sweeping Orders that established open access requirements
for interstate electricity transmission as a valid exercise of FERC's FPA
authority, despite their potential impact on retail level matters. Thus,
FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over all interstate transmission services,
even though that impacts intrastate (retail) transmission.'''^
This authority to regulate in mixed jurisdictional settings alone
supports upholding Order 745. In addition, unlike the situation in New
York, Order 745 does not divest states of any authority. It has only
indirectly affected retail rates, by encouraging a business model that will
lead to demand reductions and changes in individual states' supply and
demand curves. It has not set retail rates themselves, or even the rates at
which individual utilities can compensate DR. FERC is authorizing
consumers to participate in wholesale markets through aggregators'
assistance. There is no requirement that consumers take part in these
programs, and they are free to take part in any parallel state program.
There is only a mandate that if consumers do contract with an aggregator,
the compensation level of that aggregator's bid into the wholesale
market is fixed.
The federal regulatory scheme is not so pervasive as to preclude state
innovation. FERC has stated in Order 745 that it is not explicitly
133. /¿.at 17.
134. Id. at 12 (stating that, "[FERC's statutory jurisdiction] over sales of electric energy
extends only to wholesale sales. However, when a retail transaction is broken into two
products that are sold separately (perhaps by two different suppliers: an electric energy
supplier and a transmission supplier), we believe the jurisdictional lines change. In this
situation, the state clearly retains jurisdiction over the sale of power. However, the
unbundled transmission service involves only the provision of 'transmission in interstate
commerce' which, under the FPA, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Commission.")
135. W. at5.
136. Id. at 17 ("There is no language in the statute limiting FERC's transmission
jurisdiction to the wholesale market").
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preempting state DR programs.'" Moreover, Order 745 does not fit the
familiar standards for field (implicit) or confiict preemption.'^^ A state
might argue that Order 745 overtakes state programs by sanctioning
aggregators to siphon off the pool of potential participants in state
programs. Even if that happened, this is not the all-encompassing
"occupying the field" of DR regulation that field preemption requires.'-"
Moreover, it is just as plausible that aggregators' programs may have the
opposite effect, spurring demand for innovative state programs that
complement them.'"*"
The most likely form of state DR program that tnight be preempted is
one that compensated DR at greater than LMP.''" FERC might actually
welcome this type of program,'''^ and even if it did not, the prospect that
it would be preempted is unclear.''*'' Order 745 does not make it
"impossible" in this situation "to comply with both the state and federal
requirements,"''''' as confiict preemption requires. If a state established a
program that compensated DR above LMP, that would not affect DR bid
into the wholesale markets. Perhaps the best argtiment in favor of
preemption is that if a state established a program that compensated DR
above LMP, it would exacerbate the billing unit effect problem in the
wholesale markets. This does not rise to the level of an outright confiict
between the state and federal regulatory regimes.
137. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,676 (stating that, "[b]y issuing this Final
Rule, the Commission is not requiring actions that would violate state laws or
regulations. The Commission also is not regulating retail rates or usurping or impeding
state regulatory efforts conceming demand response.").
138. See generally Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008).
139. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
140. MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 21, at 147-48 (noting that dynamic pricing
and dispatchable load control programs "need not be mutually exclusive" and might
reinforce each other).
141. Rossi & Hutton, 5t<pra note 9.
142. Jim Rossi and Thomas Hutton find that any such program would be a salutary
development, noting, "it is hard to see how such a plan presents an obstacle to federal
goals of promoting efficiency, conservation and energy independence under the FPA."
Id.
143. Id. (arguing that this depends on whether the compensation level is treated as a
ceiling or fioor, and noting that, if' FERC's demand response pricing rules are interpreted
as a ceiling under the FPA, state conservation approaches that require utilities to make
conservation-minded decisions in procuring wholesale power could be preempted if they
require utilities to pay more than the rates FERC has approved for avoided consumption.).
144. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
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IV. FERC SHOULD PROMOTE AGGREGATORS AS A NEAR-TERM
SECOND-BEST DR SOLUTION
FERC's jurisdictional claim is on solid ground, because its approach
to DR compensation is based on system-wide impacts,'''^ and the FPA
has been interpreted to allow FERC to pursue such broad goals in
regulating matters within its authority.'"'' This part supports a second
justification for FERC's position: that it is both desirable, and a
permissible interpretation of Section 205 for FERC to promote DR by
aggregators as a means of transitioning to a future in which consumers
respond instantaneously to changes in wholesale prices.
A perfect electricity market would be transparent. Utilities would
provide constamers with information about real time prices, and consumers
would respond instantaneously to changes in wholesale prices.'''' To
economist Paul Centolella, a former state utility commissioner and
opponent of Order 745, this would be an evolutionary third generation of
demand response, or "DR 3.0."'''^ This requires a seamless connection
between the wholesale and retail marketplaces.''" At present, there are
substantial barriers to this. There is a lack of infrastmcture and appropriate
retail rate stmctures,'^" including "the lack of a direct connection
145. Rossi & Hutton, supra note 9 (noting that, "for FERC's new demand response
approach to survive legal challenges, the agency will likely need to depend on an
expansive interpretation of the goals of the FPA, as including not only consumer
protection but also reliability goals related to the system as a whole, and conservation
and environmental goals").
146. FERC's "just and reasonable" authority has been interpreted for decades to
give it broad latitude "to consider some matters going beyond the direct financial interests of
buyers and sellers in wholesale transactions [such as] 'conservation, environmental, and
antitrust questions."' Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 545 (quoting National
Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Fed. Power Comm'n., 425 U.S. 662,
670 n.6 (1976)).
147. At times, this concept is termed "price responsive demand." PAUL CENTOLELLA &
ANDREW OTT, THE INTEGRATION OF PRICE RESPONSIVE DEMAND INTO PJM WHOLESALE
POWER MARKETS AND SYSTEM OPERATIONS 1 n.2 (2009), available at http://www.hks.
harvard.eduy1iepg/Papers/2009/Centolella%20%20Ott%20PJM%20PRD%2003092009.pdf
148. Id. at I n.2 ("This can be characterized as a third generation of demand
response. First generation demand response would include utility interruptible rates and
direct load control, and RTO Demand Response programs would be a second generation
of demand response").
149. PJM iNTERCONNNECTION, L.L.C, PROCEEDINGS, PJM SYMPOSIUM ON DEMAND
RESPONSE III: INTEGRATING PRICE RESPONSIVE DEMAND 10 (2009), available at www.naruc
meetings.org/Presentations/Demand_Ott_PJMDOCS.pdf (hereinafter PJM DR SYMPOSIUM
PROCEEDINGS).
150. CENTOLELLA & OTT, supra note 147, at 3.
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between wholesale and retail prices,"'^' lack of dynamic retail pricing,
and lack of real-time information sharing.'^^ Without both enabling
technologies (such as smart meters) and policies (such as real time dynamic
pricing) in place, individual consumers cannot respond to price signals
from wholesale markets.'^''
Most consumers lack the technologies to respond to price signals.
Typical existing electric meters only measure the amount of electricity
consumed on a gross household level, and have no two-way communications
capabilities. If consumers had advanced smart meters, and sensors and
communication devices to support them, they could view their usage in
real time.'^'' An integrated system using hardware and software can record
consumption hourly or even more fi-equently.'^ ^ By one estimate, utilities
are expected to deploy about 65 million smart meters—reaching nearly
half of American households—by 2015.'^* Some utilities are updating
communications systems, establishing data analysis platforms and metrics,
and creating other systems to support the flow of real-time information.'"
This has not been a smooth process, however, as demonstrated by the
opposition to smart meters in some states. Moreover, the infrastmcture is
costly, and some state PUCs have taken a skeptical view of utilities'
proposals to deploy such advanced metering infrastmcture.
Dynamic pricing is necessary to provide price signals to consumers,'^^
but there has been political resistance to it in some states.'^' PUCs
151. FERC Order 745, iupra note 10, at 16,667.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., PJM DR SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 149, at 10-11 ("The
most important risks associated with PRD identified by symposium participants include
billing system issues; the need to develop standardized 'plug and play' in-home devices,
appliances, and control systems; the need for constant and effective customer interface;
and equipment or software obsolescence").
154. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, IS IT SMART IF IT'S NOT CLEAN?: SMART
GRID, CONSUMER ENERGY EFFICIENCY, AND DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 3 (2011), available at
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/828.
155. FERC defines "Advanced metering" as "a metering system that records
customer consumption [and possibly other parameters] hourly or more frequently and
that provides for daily or more fi-equent transmittal of measurements over a communication
network to a central collection point." FERC 2006 DR-AMI REPORT, supra note 6, at vi
n.2.
156. INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, THE EDISON FOUND., THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
SMART METERS FOR RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS 2 (2011). As of September 2011, advanced
meters made up 18.4% of all installed meters, for a total of 27.3 million smart meters.
FERC 2011 DR-AMI REPORT, supra note 20, at 3. The U.S. Department of Energy's
annual reports on the Smart Grid detail current and planned deployments of smart meters
by individual utilities. U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, supra note 9, at 22 (table listing current
and planned deployments totaling 50.7 million meters).
157. Joskow, supra note 59, at 42.
158. BORENSTEIN, ENERGY INST. AT HAUSS, supra note 64, at 2.
159. Pierce, supra note 88, at 105 (stating that, "even with strong encouragement
and partial govemmental funding, states have resisted real-time pricing").
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sometimes balk at utilities' business cases for dynamic pricing, thinking
the benefits are too speculative to justify the risk to consumers. Consumers
might save on their electric bills, "^ " but that claim is difficult to substantiate
without a demonstrated record of experience. PUCs are concemed about
the prospect of spiking marginal wholesale market costs being passed
through to consumers. The memory of the Califomia electricity crisis of
2000, where that is exactly what happened,'*' is not too distant for many
state commissioners. Order 745's opponents sometimes observe that if
the real barrier is a lack of retail dynamic pricing, the states would be
better off moving in that direction instead of FERC empowering
aggregators to offer DR in the wholesale markets. ""^  That has been a
slow grind, however, and moving forward with DR compensation might
ensure more DR is integrated into wholesale markets in the near term.
A seamless connection between the wholesale markets and consumers
requires changes at the wholesale level as well.'*^ Demand response will
reduce the need for new power plants, but regional capacify planning
processes do not currently account for this. These models do not forecast
the impacts of demand reductions from the actions of numerous
disaggregated consumers. Until RTOs and ISOs account for this dynamic
change, DR's frill value to capacify markets cannot be captured.'*^" There is
160. CENTOLELLA & OTT, supra note 147, at 3 (noting that, "The investment in AMI
will be enabled through support by retail regulatory authorities, but will be justified
based on the avoidance of capacity and scarcity pricing payments.").
161. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1315, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("In
2000, wholesale prices for electricity in Califomia increased dramatically and resulted in
the now-infamous Califomia energy crisis.").
162. HOGAN 2010 DR TECHNICAL CONFERENCE COMMENTS, supra note 92, at 6
(claiming that, "[s]pecial demand response programs provide a means to work around
the failure to offer customers dynamic prices that reflect the real costs of electricity.").
163. PowerPoint: The Demand Response Roadmap For the PJM Region 6 (PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C. 2009) (on file with author), available at http://www.pjm.com/
sitecore%20modules/web/~/media/committees-groups/stakeholder-meetings/dr/drs-III/
20091109-demand-response-roadmap.ashx (observing that, "some [needs] are areas in
which the retail market should take a leading role, some are areas in which the wholesale
market must take a leading role, and others required a joint retail/wholesale commitment.");
see, e.g., PJM DR SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 149, at 8 (PRD requires changes
to PJM's Unit Dispatch System).
164. Paul Centolella argues that planning processes should change immediately to
provide proper incentives, and not wait until consumers actually reduce demand. CENTOLELLA
& O n , supra note 147, at 3 (noting that, "it is not possible to simply wait until there is
significant Price Responsive Demand before integrating its consideration into the
determination of forward capacity and planning reserve requirements. Adjustments
to these rules are needed to ensure that the benefits of making significant AMI investments
and implementing retail rate reforms will flow through to consumers.").
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also a lack of proper information systems to bridge the gap between the
wholesale and retail levels, and promote sharing of data needed for
consumers to see real-time wholesale prices.'^'
Given the institutional obstacles to change, compensating aggregators
at LMP is an appropriate second best solution for the near term.
Aggregators may even have advantages over utilities in bringing about
demand reductions. They tend to be better at customer outreach and
marketing than utilities,'^^ which historically have not specialized in it.
Their cost stmcture can be leaner than that of utilities, so they can resist
under compensating their customers, thereby stimulating more DR.
Finally, utilities also have a well-known tendency to value power plants—
"iron in the ground"—over DR and efficiency programs.'*^ These and
other factors have been barriers to wider scale deployment of demand-
side measures over the past several decades, and there is little reason to
believe utilities will wholeheartedly embrace DR if it is left solely to
them. It may be inefficient to interpose intermediaries between consumers
and the markets,'*^ but the altemative is a suboptimal amount of DR.
As economist Alfred Kahn, a supporter of Order 745, explains:
These circumstances—specifically, the fact that pass-through of the LMP is
costly and (perhaps) politically infeasible, the possibly prohibitive cost of the
metering necessary to charge each ultimate user, moment-by-moment, the often
dramatic changes in true marginal costs for each—can justify direct payment at
full LMP to distributors and ultimate customers who promise to guarantee their
immediate response to such increases in true marginal costs of supplying them.'^'
Order 745 could also help us understand more about consumers'
demand patterns. There is some inelasticity for electricity consumption,
because it fuels so much of modem life, but economists agree that at
some levels, higher rates would lead to lower consumpfion.'™ However,
there is insufficient data on whether DR will reduce consumption.'^'
165. See, e.g., ELEC. POWER RES. INST., DECISION SUPPORT FOR DEMAND RESPONSE
TRIGGERS: METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND PROOF OF CONCEPT DEMONSTRATION, at iii
(2010) (demonstrating a proposal for "connecting retail to wholesale electricity markets").
166. MORAN & SUZUKI, RESEARCH INTO ACTION, INC., supra note 72, at 5-289 (stating
that, "[o]ne of the most important advantages of engaging aggregators is leveraging their
marketing expertise").
167. Borlick, MADRI Presentation, supra note 2, at 12.
168. W. at7.
169. FERC Order 745, supra note 10, at 16,667-68.
170. For example, a DR program may be effective at prompting substitution if it
lasts long enough to provide an incentive to consumers to switch to lower-consumption
appliances. Kathleen Spees, Meeting Electric Peak on the Demand Side: Wholesale and
Retail Market Impacts of Real-Time Pricing and Peak Load Management 35 (Sept. 2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Camegie Mellon University) (on file with author) (citing studies
by Professor Severin Borenstein on DR).
171. MASS. INST. 0FTECH.,5íípra note 21, at 147-48.
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Moreover, given the lack of economic DR to date, what has been studied
is whether consumers respond to specific incentives, not how they might
respond over time to price signals.'^^ An expansion of economic DR
would allow for more focused research on this issue.
Expanding economic DR can also generate valuable data that can be
translated into other means of saving electricify. When it becomes familiar
with their preferences, an aggregator could extend its services to offer
on-premises energy management services tailored to customers. States
could gain expertise with the nuts and bolts of business regulation of DR
aggregators, and such important matters as protecting consumer privacy.
The prospect of much larger fiows of data between consumers and
aggregators raises important concems about data privacy that must be
addressed,'^^ and states can tailor privacy protection policies to the type
of information being generated.
The data accumulated in the DR bidding process could also yield
valuable clues to improving system-wide performance at times of peak
demand. With more DR coming into the markets, RTOs and ISOs could
understand more frilly how it can be used to balance supply and demand.'^''
They could also change their capacify platming processes to refiect the
impacts of consumption savings and provide a feedback loop that in tum
allows for more DR. The enhanced frequency regulation of the electric
grid could allow for adding more distributed generation to the grid,
improving grid resilience and pricing in the markets.
Even one of FERC's principal opponents. Harvard economist William
Hogan, acknowledges that a reason to compensate DR may be to capture
future cost reductions from near term "leaming by doing.""^ The net
benefits tests will lessen any near term cost shock to consumers,"* and
172. Spees, supra note 170, at 33 (stating that, "responsiveness behavior is complex
and highly dependent on the details of the experiment including how prices are
communicated.").
173. Sonia McNeil, Note, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH.
199,201 (2011).
174. CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 17 (noting that "[i]f DR is to play an increasing
role in wholesale markets as an economic or reliability resource, system operators and
resource planners must be able to accurately predict what DR resources can provide
during system events in order to maximize their contribution to market efficiency and system
stability while minimizing overall system costs.").
175. HOGAN 2010 DR TECHNICAL CONFERENCE COMMENTS, supra note 92, at 6.
176. Professor Richard Pierce, who opposes Order 745 (preferring compensation at
LMP-G), nevertheless finds that the net benefits test should lead the court to uphold it:
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Order 745's opponents can invoke Section 206 of the FPA to request
appropriate changes to rates and policies if they believe the rates resulting
from Order 745 are unjust and unreasonable.'^^
FERC has the authority to require compensation at LMP, even if near-
term aggregate costs to market participants might be higher than current
market prices. Achieving the lowest cost of electricify is not FERC's
only permissible policy goal.'^^ As Professor Jim Rossi and Thomas
Hutton explain in a recent article, "the [FPA] has never been constmed
to require that electricify be produced and sold at the lowest possible
price, and the plain language of the FPA obviously does not compel such
an interpretation."'™ The D.C. Circuit could find that the risk of
increased costs is both lessened by the net benefits tests, and outweighed
by the benefits of gaining experience with DR while waiting for the
states to move forward with their programs.
V. CONCLUSION
DR bid by intermediaries steps in as a bridge to deal with the disconnect
between today's wholesale and retail electricity markets. Order 745's
proponents and opponents have diametrically opposing and ñmdamentally
irreconcilable positions on the value of this business model.
In a seamless electricity market, DR would not exist. Consumers
would see real time prices that would fluctuate with supply and demand
1 would uphold FERC's rule on the basis that the agency provided reasoning
adequate to support each step in its decision-making process... . While I agree
with Commissioner Moeller that the net-benefits calculation is likely to be
more confusing and burdensome than applying LMP-G, I cannot say that the
FERC's contrary belief is unreasonable.
My strong belief that LMP is an inappropriate measure of compensation in
most eases is tempered by FERC's adoption of a net-benefits test. 1 suspect
that this approach will limit compensation based on LMP to rare cases in
which LMP is not much above the appropriate level of compensation.
Pierce, supra note 88, at 108.
177. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC, 616 F.3d 520, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (2006)). Section 206 requires FERC to set the "just and
reasonable" rate where it finds that "any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed,
charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting
such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or
preferential." 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).
178. The two Supreme Court cases that form the foundation of modem interpretation of
cost based rates under the "just and reasonable" standard {Hope Natural Gas and
Permian Basin Rate Cases) require that "a court must uphold an agency's decision to
authorize particular rates if those rates fall within a 'zone of reasonableness.'" Pieree,
supra note 88, at 107 (citing Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 602 (1944); In re Permian Basin Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968)).
179. Rossi & Hutton, supra note 9, at 38.
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conditions, and adjust their consumption of electricity up or down
accordingly. Aggregators are therefore a reminder that the markets are
not seamless. Not surprisingly, opponents would rather they did not
exist. They claim that it would be superior to encourage a transparent
market, asserting that DR bid into wholesale markets is out of place in
markets meant to price electricity at low cost. In their view, the markets
were meant for sellers and buyers of electricity, not for those who intend
not to consume.
Yet opponents and FERC share common ground on two core issues.
They agree on the importance of reducing demand for electricity as a
societal goal, and that price signals should prompt deployment of generation
resources and consumers' decisions to voluntarily shed load. To move
toward that and capture DR's environmental and reliability benefits,
FERC has decided that paying DR at LMP is essential.
Order 745 is a fundamental choice between two radically different
policy paths. By opposing DR bid into the markets by intermediaries,
opponents prefer a different institutional and regulatory path for
accomplishing the transition to the future. They seek to have state
initiatives build connections between the wholesale and retail levels.
Order 745 is a different—and defensible—means of achieving the same
goal. FERC's goal of promoting new entrants in the wholesale markets,
to achieve a broad spectmm of benefits, is strongly similar to the New
York V. FERC decision approving the foundation of the wholesale market
designs.'^" This Article has argued that for this and other reasons, FERC's
choice is entitled to deference.
180. 5eeNewYorkv. FERC, 535 U.S. 1,28(2001).
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